By Thilini Kahandawaarachchi
During the last decade, China has heavily invested in ports
across the world spanning from Africa to Australia. In South Asia, they built
the Gwadar port in Pakistan and the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Despite being
a staggering US$1.12 billion investment, last week’s tripartite agreement
between Sri Lanka Ports Authority, China Merchant Port, and the Ministry of
Ports and Shipping has left many criticizing China’s investments in the
Hambantota port. In light of China’s potential long-term strategic goals, many
view Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka with unease. However, it is often
conveniently ignored that it is the successive governments of Sri Lanka that
actively sought Chinese investments. Therefore, it is important to examine why
we sought Chinese investments in the first place.
China has been a forthcoming and non-interfering alternative
to funding from international financial institutions and Western donors. They
have the excess capital and the capacity to take high risks, and they financed
the construction of the Hambantota Port at a time when no other country or
development partner was willing to invest in it. Now a Chinese company has yet
again come forward to further invest in the Hambantota Port to develop it
rather than let it squander its immense potential while generations of Sri
Lankans serve the debts on a non-performing port. From an International
Relations point of view, China also serves as a counter balance against the
regional hegemony of India and other influences on Sri Lanka.
Therefore, rather than solely blaming China for their
opportunistic investments, it is important to recognize that it is our
governments that have voluntarily and actively sought these investments and
exercised their (our) will when they reached out to China to fund a massive
port project among other infrastructure projects.
An investor, a donor, and a trade partner
Since the turn of the century, China’s exponential
growth and increasing influence in many regions spanning Australia,
Africa, and South America have attracted the attention of the world. China has
not spared South Asia in its unquenchable thirst for resources, search for
strategic locations, and reach for emerging markets.
According to the Heritage Foundation’s China Global
Investment Tracker, from 2005 to 2014 China spent US$870.4 billion in worldwide
investments and contracts, out of which US$8.9 billion was invested in Sri
Lanka. In contrast, according to the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
which is part of the World Bank group has made cumulative investments worth
US$596 million in Sri Lanka.
Even though Chinese investments in Sri Lanka are a very
small fraction compared to China’s global investments in regions such as Africa
or South America, taken in context and compared to other global investors such
as the IFC, these are considerable figures, and China’s investments in
infrastructure are prominent.
Chinese investments, grants, and trade are all intricately
interlinked. In Sri Lanka, China is the biggest source of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) pumping in more than US$400 million in 2014. China has been
involved in a variety of projects such as the Norochcholai Coal Power Plant, Mattala
International Airport, Katunayake Airport Expressway, Moragahakanda Irrigation
Development Project, and the Southern Expressway, which is also the country’s
first highway.China has also been the largest donor since 2009. China extended US$1.2 billion worth of assistance in the form of grants, loans, and credit amounting to 54% of the total US$2.2 billion committed by foreign countries and multilateral agencies. On the other hand, the Asian Development Bank invested only US$423 million and the World Bank US$241 million. China provided Sri Lanka US$5 billion in aid over the last decade.
Some of China’s lavish gifts to Sri Lanka include prominent landmarks such as the BMICH, the Superior Law Courts complex, and the Lotus Pond (Nelum Pokuna) Performing Arts Theatre among others. China also fulfilled 65% of its total pledged assistance to Sri Lanka.
China is not only a key investor and donor, but also a
significant trading partner. It surpassed the United States as Sri Lanka’s
second-largest trading partner behind India in 2013. In the same year, Sri
Lanka’s bilateral trade with China exceeded US$3 billion. All these growing aid
packages, trade relations, and investments indicate China’s increasing
involvement in Sri Lanka and its lasting footprint in the region.
From string of pearls to one belt one road
Foreign policy analysts have explained China’s expansion in
South Asia in the new millennium with diverse arguments. The most well-known
among them, especially with regard to port construction is the theory of
“string of pearls” which examines the intention of China in building commercial
and potential naval bases along the Indian Ocean region, including countries
encircling India.
Earlier this year, China turned the string of pearls theory
propounded by the west on its head with the launch of One Belt One Road (OBOR)
initiative. With OBOR, China is expected to play a global leadership role in
building infrastructure connecting China, Asia, Europe, and Africa through
ports, highways, railroads, pipelines, power, fibre and other networks.
A favourable alternative funder
Sri Lanka has enjoyed strong bilateral ties with China for
decades. There are a number of reasons for Sri Lanka to prefer China to Western
countries and multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the International Development Agency (IDA), the World Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) to obtain funds. Unlike multilateral institutions,
which impose numerous conditionalities based on human rights, democracy, and
good governance, when extending development loans, China does not interfere in
the internal workings of loan/investment recipient countries. Many countries
perceive the conditionalities imposed by international organizations as
undermining their sovereignty.
According to former Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary Palitha
Kohona, the Chinese government believes that low-key communication and mutually
beneficial dialogue, carried out on an equal footing is more efficient than the
US approach of distributing money and exerting pressure.
Further, Western countries distanced themselves from Sri
Lanka post 2009 based on war crimes allegations. During the nine-year tenure of
President Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka moved away from its traditional funding partners
such as the ADB, IMF, the World Bank and western countries, and inched closer
to China. Though the present government initially seemed to distance itself
from China in 2015, soon it realized that the West does not have the kind of
resources that China has to support Sri Lanka, and that China’s tentacles in
Sri Lanka are too deep. Besides, in the new world order, China is too big a
player to take for granted anyway.
Unlike Western donors who have been reluctant to invest in
these high-risk, large-scale infrastructure projects, China is ‘forthcoming’
with their development support and investments.
A counter balance for India and external influences
India has long seen itself as the natural leader in the
Indian Ocean region and wants to ensure that its namesake ocean remains India’s
Ocean. However, many countries both within and outside the region consider that
the Indian Ocean is not only India’s backyard but also a region to which both
littoral states and outside powers have a claim. With increasingly strong ties
with the US and aims to curb China’s expansion in the region, India threatens
to become an ever-greater hegemon in the region. While the US is strengthening
ties with India, countries such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka are strengthening
their ties with China as a way to counterbalance the regional hegemony of
India.
A closer look at Asia reveals that one of the biggest fears
for many countries in the region is strategic encirclement. India fears
encirclement by China, while China fears encirclement by the US based on the close
relations that US has with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and also its military
presence in Afghanistan. When countries in South Asia reach out to China to
fund their infrastructure projects, they are also driven by the fact that
closer ties with China will be a way to balance power with India.
China has also been a formidable friend by supporting Sri
Lanka in diverse international fora. For example, in 2012, China was strongly
against the United States backed UN Human Rights Council Resolution against Sri
Lanka. Supporting Sri Lanka against the UNHRC resolution, the former Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei stated that China opposes “using a
country-specific human rights resolution to impose pressure” and China believes
that the Sri Lankan government and people are capable of handling their own
affairs. Though not openly admitted, Sri Lanka’s closer ties with China is also
a balancing act to prevent the influence or interference from India, USA and
other global players.
Achieving long-term development goalsChinese investments are also justified as a way to achieve long-term development goals in terms of infrastructure development, employment generation, and trade expansion. The former government claimed that one of its main targets at the end of the war was to catch up on thirty years of lost development opportunities. China with its multi-million-dollar investments to put in place much-needed infrastructure became a dependable friend.
Considering that Sri Lanka is located at a strategically significant
point along the Indian Ocean, Hambantota aims to be a hub port between
Singapore and Dubai. When the Hambantota port project was proposed, the Sri
Lankan government claimed it would bring in prosperity to one of the least
developed regions of the country and create job opportunities and boost the
local and regional economy. The increased economic activity is expected to
boost economic development and contribute towards improving regional transport
linkages.
Last week’s agreement for Chinese investment in Hambantota
is endorsed with expectations of skilled employment generation, regional and
national economic development, stabilising the Sri Lankan rupee, and the
reduction of national debt percentage. Further, better transport infrastructure
will provide better access to regional markets, especially those of growing
economies such as China and India.
What’s in it for China?
There are a number of strategic, political and economic
reasons for China to be interested in the Indian Ocean region and South Asia in
particular. Though a Chinese naval base in Sri Lanka is far-fetched, it is
evident that China is interested in maintaining its presence in the Indian
Ocean region because of its strategic, economic, and political importance. Sri
Lanka is key to gaining a strong foothold in the region and as a mid-point in
the Indian Ocean where its vessels can refuel and crews can rest and
recuperate.As the world’s leading manufacturing hub and the second largest economy, China also needs to secure energy and goods supply routes along the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is only natural that China is interested in gaining a firm foothold on strategic locations along the Indian Ocean such as Hambantota and find alternatives to chokepoints such as the narrow Malacca strait.
Further, these projects provide Chinese companies
opportunities to engage in large-scale investments and earn revenue for
decades. They also provide employment opportunities for Chinese labourers and
for businesses to export Chinese machinery to be used in these projects. These
investments also boost China’s soft power strategies by creating a presence and
by being a catalyst for development. The growing economy of Sri Lanka provides
a market, albeit small, for China’s manufactured goods. China is also strategically
gathering supporters with these intricately linked economic, trade, and
cultural relations.
I
I
n 2014, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a
multilateral organization, which will fund infrastructure projects in Asia. It
will enable Asian countries to improve their infrastructure while China can
strengthen its economic and geopolitical leadership. China has taken a bold
step by stepping outside of the established US-centric multilateral
funding agency system and creating a China led-bank to fund diverse
infrastructure projects in the region. The AIIB is also a strategy for China to
legitimize its involvement in building infrastructure across the world and
expand its reach beyond the periphery. Further, it is also a move away from the
Washington based banks and Western norms to adopt a new set of norms and values
based on China’s own experiences both as an investor and a developing country.
It is based on all those interests that China is making
large-scale investments in maritime infrastructure in Sri Lanka and other South
Asian states, and China insists that their investments are only pacific and
based on goodwill between long standing friends such as Sri Lanka.
ConclusionBy nature, infrastructure developments are long-term projects that often take decades to actually reap their intended benefits. They often require further investment to develop facilities to make these projects profitable. Hambantota port was built as a transhipment and bunkering facility to refuel and provide supplies to the large number of ships that ply the main east-west shipping route. It still requires considerable investments to improve its services and facilities to make it a fully functional port.
The proposed Industrial Zone in Hambantota is important
because a port needs goods to export, and the Chinese investments in the
Industrial Zone will help to generate that volume. To reach its potential and
reap the intended benefits of this port, it is important to implement
long-term plans for Hambantota and not abandon it. That is where continued
Chinese investments in Hambantota port makes sense. The Sri Lankan government does not have the
funds to develop it, no other global port operator is interested in developing
it, and now there is a global Chinese port operator investing in it albeit for
99 years on terms largely favourable to them. For Sri Lanka, what better
alternative is there?
Speaking of China’s initial involvement in Hambantota, a
senior Sri Lankan shipping professional says, “beggars are not choosers. We did
not have the money or the expertise to develop a port. We had not built a port
in the last 100 odd years… we could have bargained much better terms (with the
Chinese investors) but at that particular time, we needed to see fast development.”
No other country would be able to give some of the instruments that are
required to build these infrastructure projects and the Chinese are very
particular about timing and speed. That sums up yet another reason why Sri
Lanka reached out to China for funding this port in the first place.While it is true that Sri Lanka did not have many options but to depend on Chinese loans and investments, there are also a number of factors such as non-interference, lack of conditionalities, China’s expertise and effectiveness in infrastructure development, and continued good relations that make China’s investments attractive.
The high interest rates, strict commercial conditions, and the alleged lack of respect for laws or the environment are some of the numerous drawbacks of Chinese financing and moreover, the lack of transparency in agreements with China has led to many controversies and alleged corruption. Now, add to all of that a 99-year foothold for China in Sri Lanka, and there is also the question what will China want next?
However, despite the common perception that China is
opportunistically using Sri Lanka and many other countries as pawns in their
great game in the Indian Ocean, it is in fact the Sri Lankan governments that
have sought Chinese loans and investments. If our government plays its cards
right, it is Sri Lanka that will eventually benefit from China’s investments.
For that, it is important that the Sri Lankan government does what is needed to
attract more FDI, develop an export economy, address issues of corruption and
deliver on the promised good governance. Irrespective of whatever government is
in power, it is also crucial to ensure that Sri Lanka does not become a
playground for regional power struggles. Only time will tell whether that is
too much to expect from our governments and its servants.
(Thilini Kahandawaarachchi is an
experienced research and communications professional and has served several
diplomatic missions and the private sector. She is also an Attorney-at-Law. This
article is based on her Master’s thesis titled “Politics of Ports: China’s
investments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh” at the University of
Washington, where she was a Fulbright Scholar. The views expressed here are
solely those of the author in her private capacity.) (Email:thilini@uw.edu)(Courtesy: www.nation.lk)
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